MORAL COGNITIONS AND PROSOCIAL RESPONDING IN ADOLESCENCE

From the late 1960s through the 1980s, research on moral judgment flourished, especially
work influenced by Kohlberg’s (1981, 1984) influential cognitive developmental
approach to moral judgment. In addition, there was a marked upsurge in empirical research
on prosocial development from the early to mid-1970s until approximately a
decade ago. Much of the early research on moral judgment included adolescent study
participants; moreover, in recent years there has been an inordinate amount of research
on adolescents’ aggression and antisocial behavior. Nonetheless, as noted by Hoffman
in 1980 and Eisenberg in 1990, studies of the prosocial aspects of moral development
during adolescence have been limited in quantity. Indeed, in 1987 Hill commented that
“capability for relatedness, connectedness, communion, and for what Gilligan has
termed ‘caring morality’ have . . . been little studied” (p. 24). Perhaps the relative
dearth of research on adolescents’ prosocial tendencies is not surprising, given that social
science researchers and the popular press have tended to emphasize the negative
aspects of adolescence, painting a picture of this developmental period as one of emotional
turmoil, hormones, and delinquency (Steinberg & Morris, 2001).
Nonetheless, there is a body of research on adolescent moral reasoning and prosocial
behavior that is informative for researchers and practitioners interested in adolescent
development. In this chapter we review findings on adolescents’ moral reasoning
or attributions and prosocial behaviors and emotional reactions (e.g., empathy and
sympathy). We begin with a brief discussion of some of the reasons why one would expect
morality to continue to develop in adolescence. Next, findings on moral cognitions
(e.g., moral judgment and attributions) are discussed, including those pertaining to
justice-oriented and prosocial issues. Then data on adolescents’ prosocial behavior (including
volunteer and civic activities) and empathy-related responding are reviewed.
Normative development (i.e., age-related changes) and variables related to individual
differences in moral development are considered. Research conducted with children in
late elementary school and high school is emphasized in this chapter, rather than work
with college students. Moreover, more recent findings and trends in conceptual and empirical
work often are highlighted; readers can access earlier reviews for detailed summaries
of prior work (e.g., Hoffman, 1980; Eisenberg, 1990).
155
Work on this chapter was supported by a grant from the National Institutes of Mental Health (1 R01 MH
60838) and the National Institute of Drug Abuse (DA05227).
THE FOUNDATIONS FOR MORAL COGNITIONS AND PROSOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT IN ADOLESCENCE
During the preschool and elementary school years, major advances are evident in moral
judgment and in regard to the frequency of some types of morally relevant behaviors
(e.g., some positive behaviors; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Rest, 1983). Nonetheless, there
are reasons to expect further change in moral cognitions and prosocial tendencies in
adolescence. First, moral judgment and prosocial behaviors such as helping, sharing,
and comforting have been linked both conceptually and empirically with perspectivetaking
skills (Eisenberg, 1986; Kohlberg, 1981, 1984), which continues to develop in
adolescence. For example, it is not until preadolescence (ages 10–12) that individuals
are “aware of the infinite regress (I know that you know that I know that you know, etc.)
characteristic of dyadic relations; that each person is simultaneously aware of his own
and others’ subjective abilities . . . [and begins] to view his own interactions with and
subjective perspectives of others from a third person perspective” (Selman, 1975,
p. 40). Moreover, later in adolescence, the individual may become aware that in taking
another’s perspective, “the mutuality of perspectives includes a view of both self and
other as complex psychological systems of values, beliefs, attitudes, etc. [and the] . . .
further awareness that the mutuality of understanding of each other’s point of view can
take place at different qualitative levels—for example, persons can ‘know’ each other
as acquaintances, friends, closest friends, lovers, etc.” (p. 40). Selman (1980) reported a
linear pattern of change in social perspective taking from childhood to adulthood, including
advances for many individuals from adolescence into adulthood. Given the
conceptual importance of understanding another’s perspective for sympathy, otheroriented
prosocial behaviors, and higher level moral reasoning, advances in perspectivetaking
skills in adolescence would be expected to be associated with further development
of these capabilities during the same period (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman,
1983; Eisenberg, 1986; Kohlberg, 1984).
Similarly, the advances in social problem-solving skills and interpersonal negotiation
skills noted during adolescence (e.g., Berg, 1989; Brion-Meisels & Selman, 1984)
would be expected to contribute to the development of other-oriented social interaction,
as would advances in conceptions of friendship and relationships (Brown & Gilligan,
1992; Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 1998; Selman, 1980) and in the ability to make
accurate attributions about others’ motives (Crick & Dodge, 1994; see also Eisenberg,
1986). In addition, changes in conceptions of the self from childhood into adolescence
likely promote moral and prosocial development. In childhood, the self is defined primarily
in terms of nonmoral properties (e.g., bodily properties, material possessions, or
typical behavior); in contrast, by late adolescence, the self is defined in terms of social
and psychological aspects of the self, and morality is the major regulator of social interactions,
whereas belief systems are central to characterizing the psychological self
(see Damon & Hart, 1988; Harter, 1999).
Finally, changes in the quality of moral reasoning and in the likelihood of sympathetic
responding during adolescence that are discussed in this chapter have been conceptually
linked to the development of altruistic tendencies (e.g., Eisenberg, 1986; Eisenberg
& Fabes, 1998). For example, Hoffman (2000) argued that the ability to sympathize
with the distresses of others who are abstract (i.e., are not in the immediate situation)
156 Moral Cognitions and Prosocial Responding in Adolescence
and with the chronic distress of others (including disadvantaged social groups) develops
in late childhood or early adolescence, based on early adolescents’ newfound ability
to view others as having continuing personal identities and life experiences beyond
the immediate situation. This change in sympathy is believed to promote adolescents’
willingness to assist abstract individuals or groups (who are not immediately present).
In brief, during late childhood and adolescence there are significant changes in sociocognitive
skills and affective responses that are believed to foster the development of
moral reasoning and altruistic tendencies (i.e., high-level prosocial responding). Therefore,
adolescence would be expected to be a period of growth for moral and prosocial
dispositions, cognitions, and behaviors.
MORAL REASONING
As mentioned previously, one reason to expect change in moral behavior in adolescence
is that moral reasoning continues to mature during adolescence and into adulthood.
Moral reasoning (or judgment), depending on its conceptualization, reflects the
structure and content of an individual’s reasoning about hypothetical or real-life moral
dilemmas—that is, how an individual justifies his or her moral decisions (Eisenberg,
1986; Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, 1979). In some studies, scores of moral reasoning may reflect
the actual decision made by a person as much or more than its reasoning (e.g., Piaget,
1932/1965).
Time does not permit an in-depth review of the basic findings on the development
of moral reasoning and recent changes in its measurement (see Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau,
& Thoma, 1999a, 1999b; Walker, in press). Rather, focal issues in recent research on
adolescents’ moral judgment are briefly summarized. These include findings on adolescents’
level of moral reasoning and its structure and the relations of moral reasoning
to adolescents’ adjustment, social competence, and risky behaviors, as well as to socialization
correlates.
The Nature of Adolescents’ Moral Reasoning
Justice Reasoning
The type of moral reasoning that has received the most empirical attention is Kohlberg’s
(1981) justice-oriented reasoning. According to Colby et al. (1983), although Stage 2
(individualism, instrumental purpose, and exchange) reasoning is predominant in early
adolescence, at about age 13, and throughout adolescence, Stage 3 (mutual interpersonal
expectations, relationships, and interpersonal conformity reasoning) moral reasoning
is the most common, dominant mode of moral reasoning. In this type of reasoning,
the “right” includes living up to what is expected by people close to you or what
others generally expect of people in your role (as son, wife, etc.). “Being good” is important
and is reflected in having good motives, showing concern for others, and maintaining
mutual relationships through trust, loyalty, respect, and gratitude (Colby et al.,
1983). At this stage, the focus in moral reasoning shifts from self-interest (Stage 2) to
fulfilling others’ expectations and concern with one’s position in others’ eyes, as well as
maintaining positive interpersonal relationships with others. Stage 4 (social system and
Moral Reasoning 157
conscience) reasoning also is used by some adolescents, but generally only infrequently.
Stage 4 reasoning increases with age from early adolescence into adulthood. Stage 4
reasoning emphasizes fulfilling the duties to which you agreed, upholding laws except
in extreme cases in which they conflict with other fixed social duties, and contributing
to the society, group, or institution (Colby et al., 1983).
Recent research is consistent with earlier findings (e.g., Dawson, 2002; Walker,
Gustafson, & Hennig, 2001; Pratt, Arnold, Pratt, & Diessner, 1999; see also Narvaez,
1998) in regard to the nature of adolescents’ moral reasoning. However, it has been argued
that what has been coded as Stage 3 might actually be two different stages (Dawson,
2002) or that there are really only three developmental schemas or levels: personal
interest (Stages 2 and 3), maintaining norms (Stage 4), and postconventional (Stages 5
and 6; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999b). Thus, there is currently no consensus
on the nature of moral stages in adolescence.
In recent years there has been a considerable amount of research in which adolescents
have been asked to reason about real-life rather than hypothetical moral dilemmas.
Walker, Pitts, Hennig, and Matsuba (1995) found that there was no significant difference
between 16- to 19-year-olds’ (senior high school students’) moral reasoning
about real-life moral conflicts (coded using Kohlberg’s stages) and 18- to 25-year-olds’
(undergraduates’) reasoning, although 35- to 48-year-olds and 65- to 84-year-olds reasoned
at higher levels than did the two younger groups. Thus, change in moral reasoning
in late adolescence about real-life moral dilemmas (as well as hypothetical dilemmas)
appears to be relatively gradual.
Consistent with Kohlberg’s theory (1981), it also appears that for justice reasoning,
at least as traditionally coded, there is a cycle of consolidation and then transition upward
from stage to stage (with a mix of reasoning—especially higher level reasoning
and one’s modal level of reasoning during the transition). These findings support a
structural model in which moral reasoning during late childhood and adolescence advances
from lower to more mature levels, with periods of apparent disequilibrium between
them (Walker et al., 2001). In addition, it appears that both adolescents and
adults are more likely to use alternative ethical systems (other than Kohlberg’s) such as
religious prescriptions, community norms, professional codes, and care reasoning when
they are in a period of transition between stages (Thoma & Rest, 1999).
Prosocial Reasoning
As was acknowledged by Thoma and Rest (1999), individuals sometimes use moral reasoning
that is not well represented in Kohlberg’s (1981) justice-oriented moral reasoning.
One type of reasoning used by adolescents is care-oriented reasoning (Perry &
McIntire, 1995; Skoe et al., 1999). According to Gilligan (1982), the focus of care reasoning
is on not turning away from others rather than not treating others unfairly (i.e.,
justice concerns). Gilligan’s care reasoning is similar to the stages of prosocial moral
reasoning delineated by Eisenberg (1986), who defines prosocial moral reasoning as
reasoning about moral dilemmas in which one person’s needs or desires conflict with
those of others in a context in which the role of prohibitions, authorities’ dictates, and
formal obligations is minimal.
In the last decade, Eisenberg and colleagues (Eisenberg, Miller, Shell, McNalley, &
Shea, 1991; Eisenberg, Carlo, Murphy, & Van Court, 1995) have followed children
158 Moral Cognitions and Prosocial Responding in Adolescence
through adolescence into early adulthood to delineate the development of their prosocial
moral reasoning. In general, they have found that some self-reflective and internalized
modes of moral reasoning (e.g., reasoning pertaining to role taking; positive or
negative affect based on the consequences of behavioral choices; positive affect related
to living up to internalized values; internalized norm, rule, and law reasoning; generalized
reciprocity) increased in use, whereas stereotypic reasoning (e.g., references to expected
or normative behavior, e.g., “it’s nice to help”) continued to decrease in use from
childhood until the late teens. The linear increases in references to positive affect and
values about consequences and negative affect about consequences was not found until
late adolescence. However, hedonistic reasoning (i.e., reasoning in which the justification
is one’s own desires, e.g., “She wouldn’t help because she would rather go to the
party”), which had decreased from childhood into early midadolescence, increased
modestly in midadolescence and then again in late adolescence, primarily for males.
Moreover, direct reciprocity and approval-oriented reasoning, which had begun to decline
in midadolescence, showed little evidence of declining in the late teens (and even
increased somewhat). Although there was a linear increase in overall level of reasoning
throughout adolescence (see also Eisenberg-Berg, 1979), moral reasoning at age 19 to
20 was not predicted from moral reasoning at earlier points in adolescence, apparently
because of substantial declines in reasoning (due to increases in direct reciprocity and
hedonistic reasoning) for some people and substantial increases in reasoning due to the
use of higher level categories of reasoning for some others. In contrast, there was some
continuity in moral reasoning from age 13 to 14 years to 17 to 18 years.
Somewhat similar findings have been obtained by other researchers using a variety
of methods (Carlo, Eisenberg, & Knight, 1992). For example, in a study of Israeli 12-
to 13-, 14- to 15-, and 16- to 17-year-olds’ self-reported motives for their own volunteering
to help, reports of altruistic motives (i.e., personal willingness to assist without
any expectation of reward or approval, and without reference to compliance) increased
with age (Bar-Tal & Nissim, 1984). Further, in work on attributions about the value of
others’ prosocial actions, investigators have found that from early adolescence into
early adulthood, students increasingly devalue prosocial actions done for self-related
reasons (e.g., tangible rewards, returning a favor), approval, or praise or to avoid criticism
and punishment and increasingly value prosocial actions done out of empathy (see
Eisenberg, 1986, 1990, for reviews).
In one of the few cross-cultural studies on the topic, Boehnke, Silbereisen, Eisenberg,
Reykowski, and Palmonari (1989) examined German, Polish, Italian, and American
elementary, junior, and high school students’ attributions for why story characters
engaged in prosocial actions. Interest in others was a relatively favored motive at all
ages, whereas self-focused motives were chosen infrequently by the preadolescents and
junior and senior high school students. Conformity-related reasons decreased with age
in Italian, German, and Polish samples across grades 6, 9, 10, and 12, whereas taskoriented
reasons (i.e., pragmatic concerns related to the completion of a task) increased.
In another sample of German students in grades 5–6 or 7–9, preference for hedonistic
motives (i.e., motives related to an individual’s feelings of physical well-being
but not other aspects of self-interest) decreased with age, and preference for taskoriented
motives (e.g., “because I know if I helped, the work would get done more
quickly”) increased. For American children in grades 2–3, 5–6, and 7–8, selection of he-
Moral Reasoning 159
donistic motives decreased with age in early adolescence (Boehnke et al., 1989). Thus,
adolescents preferred other-oriented or task-oriented motives for assisting, and conformity
and hedonistic motives were somewhat less preferred with age. The lack of an
age-related change in other-oriented motives may have been due to the format of the
measure.
Gilligan (1982) argued that care-related moral reasoning is somewhat more common
among females, and there is some support for this assertion. In a meta-analysis,
Jaffee and Hyde (2000) found a small sex difference in care-related reasoning (broadly
defined) favoring females (effect size = .28). Of particular interest, this difference was
much larger in adolescents (.53) than in children (.08), university students (.18), or
young adults who were not university students (.33). However, in adolescence, whether
girls score higher than boys in care-related reasoning may depend on the country or culture.
For example, in a study with young adolescents, a sex difference was found in
Canada but not in Norway (Skoe et al., 1999). In the United States, however, the sex
difference favoring females’ higher use of care-oriented reasoning was replicated in a
study of African American seventh graders’ reasoning about dating dilemmas (Weisz
& Black, 2002).
In regard to prosocial moral reasoning, Eisenberg et al. (1987) found that a sex difference
in types of reasoning reflecting an other-orientation seemed to emerge in early
adolescence and generally was maintained throughout adolescence for at least some
higher level modes of other-oriented moral reasoning and for the overall level of prosocial
moral reasoning (Eisenberg et al., 1991, 1995). Similarly, Boehnke et al. (1989)
found modest evidence of females providing more other-oriented and less self-interested
reasons for hypothetical story characters’ prosocial actions.
Thus, in general, investigators have found that moral reasoning and attributions regarding
motives for prosocial behavior tend to stabilize or become more other-oriented
and higher level with age during the adolescent years and that females tend to express
more of such reasoning and attributions than do males.
Relations of Higher Level Moral Reasoning to Adolescents’ Adjustment and
Social Competence
Adolescents’ levels (and type) of moral reasoning are important in part because they
relate to differences in their behavior (or attitudes toward various behaviors), including
externalizing problems, prosocial behaviors, adjustment, and risky behaviors.
Moreover, adolescents’ moral reasoning has been linked to their political attitudes and
tolerance of others.
Externalizing Problems
Adolescents’ moral reasoning has been relatively consistently related to their antisocial
behavior. In reviews a decade apart, Nelson, Smith, and Dodd (1990) and Jurkovic
(1980) found that juvenile delinquents use less mature moral reasoning than do their
nondelinquent peers. Additional studies not in those reviews generally are consistent
with their conclusions (e.g., Aleixo & Norris, 2000; Carlo, Koller, & Eisenberg, 1998;
Trevethan & Walker, 1989), although self-reported offending was not related to justicerelated
moral reasoning within a group of convicted young male offenders (Aleixo &
160 Moral Cognitions and Prosocial Responding in Adolescence
Norris, 2000). Similarly, adolescents who score lower on moral judgment are more
aggressive (for boys but not girls; Schonert-Reichl, 1999), hold more positive attitudes
toward violent groups (Sotelo & Sangrador, 1999), and are more likely to perceive intentionally
injurious sport actions as legitimate (Bredemeier, 1985). Acting out preadolescent
and adolescent males are also more accepting in their judgments about others’
aggressive actions (Sanvitale, Saltzstein, & Fish, 1989; see also Berkowitz, Mueller,
Schnell, & Padberg, 1986). Further, gains in moral reasoning due to an intervention
with delinquents have been linked to lower recidivism in adolescents (although the
gains in moral reasoning due to the intervention were not significant; Gibbs, Potter,
Barriga, & Liau, 1996).
Conversely, adolescents who reason at more mature levels are more prosocial and
socially competent. For example, higher level and other-oriented prosocial moral
judgments generally have been positively related to humanitarian political attitudes
(Eisenberg-Berg & Mussen, 1978), as well as self- and other-reported prosocial tendencies
and sympathy across the teen years (Carlo, Eisenberg, & Knight, 1992; Eisenberg
et al., 1991, 1995, 2002). Moreover, measures of moral reasoning tapping a justice
orientation more than a care orientation have been associated with Italian adolescents’
involvement in volunteer activities (Comunian & Gielen, 1995) and with 10- to 13-yearold
Canadian girls’ (but not boys’) prosocial nominations by peers (Schonert-Reichl,
1999), as well as with tolerance of others’ views or lifestyles (Breslin, 1982; Raaijmakers,
Verbogt, & Vollebergh, 1998). In regard to social competence, level of justice-oriented
moral reasoning has been related to pre- and young adolescents’ peer sociometric status
and peer nominations for leadership (girls only). Socially withdrawn behavior or shyness
with peers has been negatively related to the level of justice-related moral reasoning
for boys in early adolescence (Schonert-Reichl, 1999) and for emotionally disturbed
individuals in early and midadolescence (Sigman & Erdynast, 1988; Sigman, Ungerer,
& Russell, 1983). Further, justice-related moral judgment has been linked to higher
level social-problem-solving skills in 14- to 18-year-old inner city youth (Kennedy, Felner,
Cauce, & Primavera, 1988) and with mature ego functioning (inter- and intrapersonal
strategies for coping; Matsuba & Walker, 1998). Mature ego defense mechanisms
at ages 13–14 and 16–18 also have been associated with higher level justice-reasoning
10 to 20 years later (sometimes even when controlling for moral reasoning in adolescence;
Hart & Chmiel, 1992). Thus, although the findings have not always been significant
and the percent of variance accounted for by these relations is generally modest,
adolescents who are more advanced in their moral reasoning appear to be not only
more moral in their behavior but also better adjusted and higher in social competence.
The Relation of Moral Judgments to Adolescents’ Attitudes About Risky Behavior
A special concern in adolescence is with the rise in risky behaviors such as drug use,
sexual activity, and suicide. Although very limited, there is some evidence of links between
cognitions about morality and adolescents’ tendencies to endorse or engage in
such behaviors.
Some investigators have examined the relation of level of moral judgment to adolescents’
risky behavior. There appear to be weak but not very consistent relations between
the two (Berkowitz et al., 1995). For example, in a study of undergraduates,
Hubbs-Tait and Garmon (1995) found that risk taking during sexual intercourse (i.e.,
Moral Reasoning 161
lower likelihood of using condoms) was inversely related with level of justice-related
moral reasoning (on Rest’s, 1979, defining issues test, or DIT). In contrast, in a study
of sexually active teenage girls, Jurs (1984) found no relation between moral reasoning
(also on the DIT) and the responsible use of birth control, getting pregnant, and the decision
to abort (although adolescents reasoning at higher levels were more likely to have
taken a sex education course).
However, whether an individual considers a given risky behavior to be a moral issue
may moderate the relation of moral judgment to risky behaviors. Some investigators
have examined adolescents’ tendencies to categorize risky behaviors as involving
moral, social-conventional, personal, or prudential decisions. Moral judgments involve
categorical and prescriptive judgments of right and wrong about interpersonal issues
such as harm and justice. Social-conventional issues pertain to customs or regulations
intended to ensure social coordination and social organization, such as choices about
modes of dress, table manners, and forms of greeting. Personal choices refer to issues of
private behavior that impinge primarily on the self. For example, within Western culture,
the choice of friends or recreational activities usually is considered a personal
choice, whereas prudential issues involve actual or potential self-harm (but do not involve
others’ welfare; Nucci, Guerra, & Lee, 1991; Tisak, Tisak, & Rogers, 1994).
Many high school students consider the use of legal drugs such as nicotine, caffeine,
and alcohol, as well as premarital sex, as a personal or prudential choice (especially the
latter, if assessed) rather than a behavior that should be controlled by authorities or as
a moral issue (Killen, Leviton, & Cahill, 1991; Kuther & Higgins-D’Alessandro, 2000;
Nucci et al., 1991). In contrast, the use of illegal drugs such as cocaine, crack, and marijuana
is less likely to be viewed as an issue under personal jurisdiction and is more
likely to be viewed as wrong, regardless of authority or laws (Killen et al., 1991). Risky
behaviors are seldom viewed as social-conventional issues (Killen et al., 1991; Nucci et
al., 1991; see Tisak et al., 1994, for data on adolescents’ views on the legitimacy of parents’
attempts to prohibit contact with drug-using friends). Of importance, students
who are higher in the use of drugs are more likely than are their low-using students to
view the drug use as a personal choice (Kuther & Higgins-D’Alessandro, 2000), and
less likely to view it as harmful and a prudentially unacceptable choice (wrong only because
it hurts the self; Nucci et al., 1991). High drug users also are more likely to view
themselves as the only authority with regard to the choice to use drugs and are less
likely than are their peers to view parents or the law as legitimate authorities (Nucci et
al., 1991). Moreover, in one study, adolescents’ views about the nature of decisions regarding
drug use were found to moderate the relation of the level of justice-related
moral reasoning to drug use. When adolescents considered drug use a moral decision,
a higher degree of substance use was related to lower level justice-oriented moral reasoning,
whereas moral reasoning was unrelated to the use of drugs for adolescents who
considered it to be a personal decision (similar findings were not obtained for sexual
behavior or suicide; Kuther & Higgins-D’Alessandro, 2000). Findings such as these
suggest that moral reasoning is related to some risky behaviors, but only for adolescents
who view them as having moral relevance. However, it is not clear whether moral reasoning
actually affects risky behavior or participation in risky behavior affects how
adolescents categorize risky behaviors.
162 Moral Cognitions and Prosocial Responding in Adolescence
Socialization of Moral Reasoning
Parental Influences
Socialization by parents typically has been assigned a circumscribed role in moral development
by cognitive developmental theorists such as Kohlberg (Walker & Hennig,
1999). Thus, it is not surprising that the contributions of parenting to the development
of moral reasoning have not been studied extensively. Some aspects of socialization
that have received the most attention in studies with adolescents are parental moral
reasoning, parental warmth, and aspects of parent-child discussions that might stimulate
perspective taking or autonomous moral thinking.
Based on cognitive developmental theory, one would expect parenting practices that
create cognitive conflict about moral issues to be linked to higher level moral judgment.
Somewhat consistent with this notion, there is evidence that a Socratic style of discussion
(encouraging the child to form opinions and to use reasoning) between parents
and children, combined with other variables (such as parental support) is most conducive
to the development of justice-related moral reasoning in late childhood and adolescence.
Based on studies in which parents and their child discussed hypothetical and
real-life moral dilemmas (sometimes one in the child’s life) and attempted to reach a
consensus, Walker and Hennig (1999) concluded that
parents who engage in cognitively challenging and highly opinionated interactions, who
are hostile, critical, and interfering, and who display poor ego functioning (defensiveness,
rigidity, rationalization, insensitivity, inappropriate emotional expression) provide a context
that hinders children’s opportunities to move toward more mature moral understandings.
In contrast, effective parents are more child-centered and scaffold their child’s development
by eliciting the child’s opinions, drawing out the child’s reasoning with appropriate
probing questions, and checking for understanding; all in the context of emotional support
and attentiveness and with the challenging stimulation of advanced moral reasoning.
(pp. 370, 372)
In Walker’s studies, parent behaviors such as critiquing and directly challenging the
child (especially in a hostile manner), presenting of counterconsiderations, and simply
providing information were not associated with children’s moral growth. Direct challenges
to the child’s reasoning may have been viewed as hostile by the child and, consequently,
may have been counterproductive, whereas simple provision of information
may have been viewed as lecturing (Walker & Hennig, 1999; Walker, Hennig, & Krettenauer,
2000; see Walker & Taylor, 1991). Similar findings in regard to style of interactions
have been found in other studies of preadolescents or adolescents, although
there are some inconsistencies in the literature. Buck, Walsh, and Rothman (1981) examined
the relation of parental behaviors during a discussion with their 10- to 13-yearold
boys’ moral reasoning of how to handle sons’ aggression. Boys with higher moral
reasoning had parents who considered their son’s view and tended to encourage their
son to express his views. Similarly, Holstein (1972) found that parents who encouraged
their children’s participation in discussion and decision making were more likely to
have children who reasoned at relatively high levels. In contrast to Walker and Hennig
Moral Reasoning 163
(1999), Pratt et al. (1999) observed that fathers’ tendencies to extend, challenge, or clarify
the reasoning of their adolescents were positively related to adolescents’ concurrent
moral reasoning and reasoning two years later. Similar findings were not obtained for
mothers, although mothers’ tendencies to consider their children’s perspectives when
recalling socialization encounters were related to higher level moral reasoning at the
2-year follow-up.
Other investigators besides Walker and Hennig (1999) have obtained associations
between parental warmth or involvement and high-level moral reasoning in adolescents
(e.g., Buck et al., 1981; McDevitt, Lennon, & Kopriva, 1991; Palmer & Hollin,
1996; Powers, 1988; Speicher, 1992). In some relevant studies, researchers found relations
between parental nurturance and moral reasoning for one parent or for one group
of children (e.g., age or sex group) but not the other (e.g., Bakken & Romig, 1994; Hart,
1988). Inconsistencies may occur because parental warmth by itself probably is not sufficient
to stimulate higher level moral reasoning. As noted by Hoffman (2000), parental
warmth provides an optimal environment for socialization because children are more
likely to attend to parents and care about pleasing them when the relationship generally
is supportive. Thus, parental warmth may not have a direct effect on children’s
moral reasoning but may moderate the effectiveness of other parental practices in fostering
the growth of moral reasoning. A combination of warmth and other productive
parental practices such as using a Socratic method in discussions and holding high
standards for children may be necessary to foster adolescents’ moral reasoning. In support
of this premise, authoritative parenting (which includes support, demands for appropriate
behavior and control, and practices such as induction) has been linked to
higher level moral judgment in adolescents (Boyes & Allen, 1993; Pratt et al., 1999), although
democratic parenting has not always been associated with adolescents’ moral
reasoning (Speicher, 1992).
Consistent with the relation of authoritative parenting to higher level moral reasoning,
there appears to be a modest relation between parental use of inductions (reasoning)
during discipline and older children and adolescents’ moral judgment (Janssen,
Janssens, & Gerris, 1992), although such relations often vary across parent, social class,
or age group (e.g., Eisikovits & Sagi, 1982; Parikh, 1980; see Eisenberg & Valiente,
2002, for more detail). Moreover, parental emphasis on prosocial behavior has been associated
with higher level prosocial moral reasoning (McDevitt et al., 1991). Further,
agreement between parents in regard to child-rearing practices, attitudes, and values at
age 3 has predicted higher moral reasoning for 14-year-old males (but not females;
Vaughn, Block, & Block, 1988).
In summary, higher level reasoning in adolescence is related to parenting that is supportive
and stimulates adolescents to question and expand on their reasoning, as well
as with an authoritative parenting style (including inductive discipline). However, findings
are limited in number and sometimes inconsistent (e.g., Leahy, 1981; see Eisenberg
& Valiente, 2002). Although infrequently examined, it is possible that the parenting behaviors
and characteristics associated with adolescents’ moral judgment vary across
adolescence. For example, based on her finding that moral judgment was predicted by
reports of comfort with and frequency of family moral and political discussions in later
adolescence and early adulthood, but not earlier adolescence, Speicher (1992) suggested
that the quality of interpersonal family relationships may be more important for
164 Moral Cognitions and Prosocial Responding in Adolescence
the development of moral reasoning in early adolescence, whereas aspects of the family
environment related to cognitive stimulation and perspective taking may be important
at an older age. Currently, there are too few data to test such a prediction. Moreover,
because all the extant data with adolescents are correlational, it is unclear to what
degree parental behaviors actually cause changes in adolescents’ moral reasoning; indeed,
variations in adolescents’ moral reasoning may elicit different parenting styles
and practices (and some other factor such as genetics may affect both parenting and
adolescents’ moral judgment). In addition, it is unclear whether the findings just reviewed
generalize to non-Western countries; little of this work was conducted in non-
Western societies, and there is debate regarding the degree to which systems for coding
moral judgment developed in the United States accurately represent the development
of moral judgment in non-Western, nonindustrialized countries.